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Abstract: Crowdfunding is helping to drive financial inclusion by expanding the availability of 
funds to traditionally excluded and underserved groups of individuals, such as ethnic minority and 
female entrepreneurs. This study verifies how ethnic and gender similarity between investor and 
entrepreneur can affect the invested amount in an equity crowdfunding campaign. Using an 
integrated approach with linear regression and Shapley decomposition, we analyze 8600 
investments made by 5996 unique personal shareholder investors in 81 equity crowdfunding 
campaigns. Results show that similarity patterns seem to significantly influence the amount 
invested in a campaign but their effects change according to investor’s gender and ethnic origin. In 
fact, even if female investors give a higher amount to men-led companies, their preference changes 
if the company is run by a female founder belonging to the same ethnic minority group. Results 
emphasize equity crowdfunding’s potential as a tool for the financial inclusion of ethnic minority 
groups of investors and entrepreneurs. 
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1. Introduction 
Crowdfunding industry is revolutionizing the financial services market, by allowing to obtain 
financial resources required for developing new products and technological innovations competing 
with traditional entrepreneurial finance players [1]. Among crowdfunding models, equity 
crowdfunding is expected to democratize access to finance by increasing capital availability for 
micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), by reducing social structure constraints and by 
enabling entrepreneurs to better promote their investment requests to a new wave of investors [2–5]. 
In this framework, this study verifies whether and how the ethnic and gender similarity among 
founder and investor affects the invested amount in an equity crowdfunding campaign, allowing for 
a better understanding of the role played by equity crowdfunding as a transformative tool for 
supporting the financial inclusion of female and ethnic minority entrepreneurs and investors, thus 
filling a gap still existing in the empirical literature [6]. 
Currently, studies on crowdfunding primarily focus on the demand side, highlighting which 
characteristics of entrepreneurs and their start-ups are determinants of campaign success [7–12]. 
From the supply side, most prior scholarly research has concentrated on ascertaining investors’ 
motivations for participating in crowdfunding campaigns [13–15] or on detecting biases that affect 
investment decisions [16]. Among the latter, several studies have pinpointed the presence of gender 
similarity effect for which female investors support female entrepreneurs, that especially in the 
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financing market have difficulty gaining access to external capital for the creation of new ventures 
[2,17,18]. 
The empirical evidence shows that financial resources to start new ventures are particularly 
problematic for female entrepreneurs, but also for other groups of entrepreneurs such as those from 
ethnic minorities, who often force them toward informal sources of capital or to resort to personal 
networks [19–22]. Equity crowdfunding may present a new tool for overcoming the financial 
constraints also for ethnic minority entrepreneurs, since similarity of ethnic profile between 
entrepreneur and investors may be crucial in generating trust and reducing information asymmetry 
between them [23–25]. The academic literature on ethnicity and crowdfunding is in its infancy [26–
28] and usually it does not include ethnic-based similarity because of the difficulty of distinguishing 
members of ethnic groups [29]. 
Finally, we did not find any studies that combine ethnic and gender similarity in analyzing how 
their coexistence influences the invested amount on equity crowdfunding campaigns. The diverse 
backgrounds of participants in equity crowdfunding markets permits greater nuance in studying the 
influence of similarity attraction in funding decisions, so studies about the matching between 
entrepreneurs and investors are needed [6]. 
To verify whether and how ethnic and gender similarity increase the amount invested by a single 
crowdfunding investor, we collected information on 8600 investments made by 5996 unique personal 
shareholder investors on the British equity crowdfunding platform Crowdcube. For this study, only 
the projects that were successfully concluded have been selected; those that did not reach the end or 
those failed and cancelled by the platform are not part of the analysis. Information from founders 
and shareholders were obtained from documents filed and hosted on the Companies House website 
(companieshouse.gov.uk). To identify investors’ gender, we use the genderize.io tool, while details 
of ethnic origin are obtained by surname geographic distribution using forebears.io, a genealogical 
source. 
Our results show that, in equity crowdfunding, ethnic and gender similarities play different 
roles depending on the investor’s characteristics—ethnicity, gender or a combination of the two. 
Particularly, while, in general, in equity crowdfunding, female investors give a higher amount to 
men-led companies, ethnic minority female investors invest a higher amount if the company is run 
by a female founder belonging to the same ethnic minority, thus indicating the existence of a 
similarity effect driven by ethnicity. 
Among the aspects that influence the variability of the amount invested, those detected through 
a Shapley decomposition [30], founder profile and company characteristics are the most significant; 
nonetheless, ethnic and gender similarities, as sociodemographic aspects, also have a non-negligible 
influence on the heterogeneity of the total amount invested. 
Our results, contribute, at first, to the literature on similarity effect in the context of 
entrepreneurial finance (e.g., [23,25,29]) considering both ethnic and gender similarity. Second, our 
work is among the few recent papers that analyze shareholders’ characteristics and the determinants 
of the amount invested (e.g., [31,32]). In fact, with respect to the previous crowdfunding literature 
[29,33], where similarity is usually proxied by the number of female/male investors involved in the 
campaign, our study considers the actual amount invested in the campaign by the single investor. In 
equity crowdfunding context, compared to donation or reward-based crowdfunding, the actual level 
of amount invested is a more precise representation of the effective degree of investor participation 
and engagement in the company that can condition the investment evaluation process. Investors after 
an equity crowdfunding campaign became company’s shareholders, sharing the risks associated with 
the uncertainty surrounding the implementation of business ideas, the profitability of start-up and 
the lack of a secondary market for pricing, liquidation and exit. 
Finally, our study extends the framework of crowdfunding as a tool for strengthening financial 
inclusion by showing it to be a meaningful support for ethnic minority entrepreneurs, enabling them 
to better promote their investment requests to a new wave of investors. Researchers and policy 
makers alike are offered the opportunity to evaluate potential financial inclusion issues with relevant 
data. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and 
posits the research questions. Sections 3 and 4 present the data and variables used in the empirical 
analysis while Section 5 presents the main results and reports the robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 
discusses and concludes the paper, pointing out its implications, limits and future research directions. 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
The ‘similarity effect’ is the tendency of the members of a group to display a preference for 
associating with other members of the same group. This tendency is often described as ‘birds of a 
feather flock together’ or homophily [24,34]. Lazarsfeld and Merton [35] distinguish between two 
types of homophily: status homophily, in which similarity is based on informal, formal, or ascribed 
status, and value homophily, which is based on values, attitudes, and beliefs. Status homophily 
includes the main sociodemographic factors such as race, ethnicity, gender or age, and acquired 
characteristics such as religion, education, occupation or behavioral patterns. This pure, preference-
based mechanism highlights the role of personal similarities in breeding connections and is a basic 
organizing principle present across a wide range of social interaction contexts such as friendship, 
social relations and business alliances [36]. Among status homophily factors, ethnicity creates the 
strongest divides in our personal environments and researchers have found strongly homophilous 
association patterns by race and ethnicity [36]. Race is an ascribed category linked to genetic, 
biological and physical features that characterize a group of people, and racial group membership 
changes across time and context [37]. Ethnicity, on the other hand, is a category that reflects a group’s 
common history, nationality, geography, language and culture, and the status it refers to is less 
reductionist than that of race [37]. When ethnicity refers to a group, it implies that members have 
some awareness of group membership and a common national background and culture [38]. When 
ethnicity is linked to business founding, it represents a set of connections and social structures among 
the members of an ethnic group and the ways in which those social structures are used [39]. 
Interpersonal similarity has received significant research attention in sociology, but we do not 
know much about its impact on investment decisions. 
Research on crowdfunding focuses principally on status homophily, considering investors’ 
gender as common basis for similarity. In donation projects, female capital providers prefer to 
support projects founded by women rather than those founded by men because of the gender 
similarity between female backers and entrepreneurs [2,17,18]. Greenberg and Mollick [29] put 
forward an explanation for this phenomenon by introducing the concept of activist choice homophily: 
that is, the desire of female investors to support female entrepreneurs in technology industries due 
to the perceived unjustified barriers that women have to face in that sector. For equity crowdfunding 
campaigns, Vismara et al. [33] conclude that the number of female investors is considerably higher 
in female-led campaigns, that also display higher success rates, while the number of male investors 
is slightly higher in campaigns launched by male-led firms. Horvat and Papamarkou [40] find similar 
results. 
To the best of our knowledge, the academic literature on ethnicity and equity crowdfunding 
does not include ethnic-based similarity, although the online context where crowdfunding is 
developed can improve solidarity within ethnic minority groups, mobilizing ethnic networks [27] 
and in-group favoritism [41]. In other entrepreneurial financial contexts, only few studies analyze 
how ethnic similarity influences the mobilization of funding resources. In the venture capital 
selection process, shared ethnicity between founder and venture capital team increases the 
probability of an investment match and has high predictive power for early-stage investments [23, 
24]. Moreover, it also influences the preference to collaborate with other venture capitalists [25]. 
The operation of similarity leads us to the following predictions: 
H1a. The amount invested in an equity crowdfunding campaign is higher when there is an ethnic similarity 
between investor and founder. 
H1b. The amount invested in an equity crowdfunding campaign is higher when there is a gender similarity 
between investor and founder. 
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Another important finding is that the more similarity patterns there are between two individuals, 
on both sociodemographics characteristics and values, attitudes, and beliefs, the stronger the 
interpersonal connections they create [42,43]. “The patterns of homophily tend to get stronger as more 
types of relationships exist between two people, indicating that homophily on each type of relation 
cumulates to generate greater homophily for multiplex than simplex ties” [36] (p. 418). About gender 
and ethnic origin, people of the same gender and ethnic group should prefer to support each other 
because of the perceived trust in the members of their group [44]. In this sense, equity crowdfunding 
represents the ideal setting to test the effect of multiple similarity patterns on the level of amount 
invested. The following prediction can be stated: 
H2. The amount invested in an equity crowdfunding campaign is higher when ethnic and gender similarity 
coexists between investor and founder. 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1. The Data Collection 
We collected data from Crowdcube, the largest generalist equity crowdfunding platform in the 
UK [45], funded in 2011, and from Companies House website. At first, we collected information on 
campaigns posted on Crowdcube from October 2011 to January 2016. We only considered the first 
equity crowdfunding campaign successfully run by a single company and where the proponent was 
a physical person. In total, we collected information on 244 equity crowdfunding campaigns. Then, 
we checked for the presence of information for each of the Crowdcube’s campaigns on Companies 
House website. We found the complete set of documents and the full list of shareholders only for 81 
out of the 244 companies. In particular, on Companies House website, we were able to extract the 
name and the surname of the founder and the full list of shareholders from the Annual Return form 
(Module AR101), filed in accordance with Section 854 of the Companies Act 2006, at the dates 
immediately after and immediately before the campaign. On AR101 module, we collected also the 
number of shares subscribed by each investor. The price of shares, when not disclosed directly in the 
AR101 module, was obtained by dividing the amount collected during the equity crowdfunding 
campaign by the total number of shares subscribed by investors during the campaign. 
For this study, only the projects that were successfully concluded, closed, and all personal 
investments collected have been selected; those that did not reach the end or those failed and 
cancelled by the platform are not part of the analysis. For failed campaigns, the platform does not 
publish the level of amount invested by each participant during the fundraising. Therefore, once the 
campaign has fully funded and is closed for investment, investors have a cooling off period of seven 
days where they can choose to reduce or withdraw the investment amount (Crowdcube.io). The list 
of shareholders publicly available on Module AR101 is composed of all confirmed amounts invested 
and future new company’s shareholders. 
The dataset includes 8683 investments made by 6030 investors. For the purpose of our analysis, 
we exclude the 83 investments (nearly 1% in terms of number of investments and less than 6% in 
terms of amount invested) made by 34 legal entities. 
3.2. Identification of Ethnicity and Gender 
In the empirical analysis, various methodologies have been used to identify individual ethnicity, 
such as direct survey [46,47], post-secondary education in the biographies [48], and inference from 
individual names [23,24,49–51]. For identifying founders’ and investors’ ethnicity, we refer to the last 
methodology, looking for the individual’s surname on the forebears.io tool, a genealogical source, 
which includes information on the geographical distribution of 27 million surnames. The algorithm 
returns the nation in which the surname occurs, the frequency of a specific surname, and the rank by 
incidence. We create the final matching list in several steps. First, to identify ethnicity, we consider 
the nation with the highest incidence and the densest occurrence. Second, for surnames with different 
incidence and density as in Bengtsson and Hsu [23], we hand-checked ethnic background with the 
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surname-matching algorithm developed by Kerr [51, 52] and with information stemming from 
different sources such as ancestry.com as in Bhagwat and Liu [49], which provides a distribution of 
U.S. immigrants based on port entry records. Only for female investors, we cross-check on Onolytics 
software the ethnic group attribution using the investors’ full name [53]. This check has been done to 
control for the female practice, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, of adopting the husband’s 
surname. 
Individual investors’ ethnicity is divided into nine groups (more details on classification are 
available upon request to the authors): African, Anglo-Saxon, Arabic, Asian, Oriental Bloc, European, 
Israeli, Southern African, and Latin American. This classification is in line with the one usually 
adopted in studies focused on the evaluation of the financial constraints faced by certain ethnic 
minority communities [54–56]. Most investors have Anglo-Saxon origin (69.8%), followed by those 
with Asian (9.4%) and European (8.1%) origins. African, Oriental, Latin American, Arabic, Southern 
African, and Israeli investors represent the remaining 13% of our sample. To understand the potential 
of capital availability for these traditionally underrepresented groups, we focus on two main investor 
groups: the dominant group, that is, investors that belong mainly to British and European origin 
ethnic groups (Anglo-Saxon, European, Oriental Block, Southern African, and Israeli), and the 
minority group, that is, investors that belong to underrepresented ethnic groups in the British and 
European financial market (Asian, African, Latin American, and Arabic). 
Founders’ gender is directly available on the information stored on Company House website 
while investors’ gender is inferred through automated methods since this information is not 
published in the filed documents. Following previous studies [6,29,57], we use the genderize.io tool 
to compare first names with a database including 86,710 distinct names across 81 languages. The 
algorithm returns the gender and the probability that the name-gender attribution was correct; a 
probability higher than 90% was found for the vast majority of the assignments, thus suggesting the 
high degree of accuracy of the method. When probability is less than 90% or the algorithm returns 
no attribution or in cases of unisex names, we cross-check the accuracy of the codes and complete the 
missing variables using LinkedIn and Facebook user profile pictures and Google Search. 
3.3. The Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Our final sample includes 8600 investments made by 5996 unique personal shareholder 
investors in 81 equity crowdfunding campaigns. Female investors represent nearly 23% (18% in terms 
of number of investments) of the total, while ethnic minority investors constitute nearly 18%. More 
than 40% of the total number of investments are carried out by the so called “serial” investors, that is 
to say, investors with at least two investments made (Table 1—Panel A). Our sample is a broad cross-
section of companies from different industries and of various ages at the time of the equity 
crowdfunding campaigns (Table 1—Panel B). On average, the firms in the sample are 2.2 years old 
with a maximum of 11 years, more than 20% belonging to highly innovative sectors on the basis of 
SIC codes and with an average team size of 3.6 people. In terms of campaign structure (Table 1—
Panel C), we observe the goal amount—i.e., the target amount of money set in each campaign—the 
percentage of total equity offered—i.e., the percentage of equity that a management team plans to 
offer to investors prior to the offering—the number of exit strategies—i.e., the pre-planned strategies 
of how an investor can get out of an investment as proposed by the founder during the campaign 
such as IPOs, trade sale, share buy-back, etc., and the total amount raised at the end of the campaign—
i.e., the effective total amount of capital raised during the campaign that can be different from the 
goal amount in case of an overfunded campaign. On average, the logarithm of the goal amount is 
11.6 (£185,033) while the logarithm of the amount raised is 11.8 (£223,153) with a maximum of 14.5 
(£1.9 m) and a minimum of 9.4 (£10,000). The percentage of equity offered in our sample is nearly 
18%, and 65 campaigns (more than 80%) envisage at least one exit strategy. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the key variables. 
Panel A: Sample Overview Obs      
Number of equity crowdfunding campaigns 81      
Number of investments made by personal investors 8600      
Number of investments made by ethnic minority investors 1568      
Number of investments made by dominant investors 7032      
Number of unique ethnic minority investors 1064      
Number of unique dominant investors 4932      
Number of investments made by female investors 1603      
Number of investments made by male investors 6997      
Number of unique female investors 1361      
Number of unique male investors 4635      
Number of investments made by serial investors 2526      
Panel B: Companies Obs mean min p50 max Sd 
Company age at the date of the ECF campaign (in years) 81 2.2 0 2 11 2.3 
Company sector Innovative (1 = yes; 0 = no) 81 0.2    0.4 
Team size (number) 81 3.6 1 3 12 2.8 
Panel C: Campaigns Obs mean min p50 max Sd 
Goal amount [Ln (£)] 81 11.6 9.2 11.5 14.5 1.0 
Total equity offer (in %) 81 17.7% 4.0% 16.8% 48.0% 0.1 
Exit strategies (number) 81 0.8 0 1 1 0.4 
Total amount raised [Ln (£)] 81 11.8 9.4 11.8 14.5 1.0 
Panel D: Investors Obs mean min p50 max Sd 
Investors per campaign (number) 81 106 8 83 394 81 
Ethnic minority investors per campaign (number) 81 19 1 15 75 16.7 
Fraction of ethnic minority investors per campaign (%) 81 17.5% 6.3% 17.4% 35.5% 0.1 
Fraction of dollar amount ethnic minority investors 
invested per campaign (%) 
81 19.9% 0.9% 18.8% 70.7% 0.2 
Female investors per campaign (number) 81 20 1 12 125 24 
Fraction of female investors per campaign (%) 81 17.5% 3.6% 15.4% 45.6% 0.1 
Fraction of dollar amount female investors invested per 
campaign (%) 
81 23.0% 1.7% 17.3% 50.6% 0.2 
Amount invested by personal investors [Ln (£)] 8600 5.65 0.2 5.53 14.15 2.0 
Amount invested by ethnic minority investors [Ln (£)] 1568 5.45 1.74 5.3 11.48 2.0 
Amount invested by dominant investors [Ln (£)] 7032 5.69 * 0.2 5.58 14.15 2.0 
Amount invested by female investors [Ln (£)] 1603 5.41 1.21 5.3 11.85 2.0 
Amount invested by male investors [Ln (£)] 6997 5.70 * 0.2 5.58 14.15 2.0 
Amount invested by non-serial investors [Ln (£)] 6074 5.88 2.08 5.9 14.15 2.1 
Amount invested by serial investors [Ln (£)] 2526 5.09 * 1.75 4.99 10.85 1.8 
Panel E: Founders Obs mean min p50 max Sd 
Founders (number) 81 1.3 1 1 3 0.5 
At least 1 ethnic minority founder 81 0.2 0 0 1 0.4 
At least 1 female founder 81 0.2 0 0 1 0.4 
Notes: * Difference in mean values with respect to the complementary group (respectively, 
“dominant/ethnic minority”, “female/male”, “non-serial/serial”) is statistically significant at 1% level. 
The average number of investors per campaign is 106, with the most crowded campaign 
involving 394 investors. On average, the logarithm of amount invested by the single investor is 5.6 
(£2102); preliminary findings from our sample highlight the fact that women (£1766) and people 
belonging to an ethnic minority (£1724) tend to invest a lower amount of £ than men (£2179) and 
those belonging to the dominant ethnicity (£2186) respectively (Table 1—Panel D). Our descriptive 
evidence on the lower amount invested by female investors at the mean and the median is in line 
with the results of Hervé et al. [32], from Wiseed, a French Platform. The under-representativeness 
of women among investors in equity crowdfunding campaigns or among people making venture 
and angel capital investments is confirmed by other studies in the literature (e.g., [32,33,58,59,]). 
Finally, the average number of founders is 1.3 with a maximum of 3. Additionally, in this case, 
women and people belonging to an ethnic minority turn out to have a lower entrepreneurship level 
than the others, since only 20 percent of campaigns have at least one female or at least one ethnic 
minority proponent (Table 1—Panel E). These findings are likely to be related to the fact that in a 
financial and entrepreneurial context, females generally report a higher risk aversion and lower 
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financial resources [60,61] while ethnic minorities show lower level of business-related experiences 
[62]. 
3.4. Ethnic and Gender Similarities 
The main objective of this paper is to provide empirical-based indicators on the effect of ethnic 
and gender similarities on amount invested in an equity crowdfunding campaign. Before that, this 
section presents some findings on the presence of these similarities in our sample of investors. 
Co-ethnicity, thus, the case in which macro-ethnicity of investor and at least one founder is the 
same, accounts for nearly 70% of all cases (Table 2—Panel A). As for co-gender, thus, cases in which 
the gender of investor and the gender of at least one founder matches, Table 2—Panel B shows that 
it accounts for nearly 68% of investments. Specifically, of the 1946 investments made in female-led 
companies, 425 (21.8%) are attributed to female investors, while of the 6654 investments made in 
male-led companies, 5476 (82.3%) are attributed to male investors. 
As an econometric deepening on this aspect, we developed some Probit estimations on the 
probability to invest in an equity crowdfunding campaign with at least one female proponent. Results 
confirm, with a statistically significance at 1% level, that women tend to invest more frequently in 
this type of campaign, even when controlling for other individual characteristics (i.e., ethnicity and 
seriality) and for campaign characteristics. The same occurs for investors belonging to an ethnic 
minority with regard to the probability to invest in a campaign with at least one ethnic minority 
proponent. 
Table 2. Number of investments and amount invested by similarity. 
Panel A: Number of Investments by Ethnic Similarity 
Investor ethnicity 
Founder ethnicity 
Total Dominant Minority 
Dominant 
5684 1348 7,032 
66.1% 15.7% 81.8% 
Minority 1203 365 1568 
14.0% 4.2% 18.2% 
Total 6887 1713 8600 80.1% 19.9% 100.0% 
Panel B: Number of investments by gender similarity 
Female investor Female founder Total 
No Yes 
No 5476 1521 6997 63.7% 17.7% 81.4% 
Yes 
1178 425 1603 
18.6% 4.9% 18.6% 
Total 6,654 1946 8600 
77.4% 22.6% 100.0% 
Panel C: Number of investments by ethnic and gender similarity 
Gender similarity 
Ethnic similarity 
Total No Yes 
No 1254 2414 3668 
14.6% 28.1% 42.7 
Yes 1445 3,487 4,932 16.8% 40.6% 57.4% 
Total 
2699 5901 8600 
31.4% 68.6% 100.0% 
Panel D: Amount invested [Ln (£)] by ethnic and gender similarity 
Gender similarity Ethnic similarity Total 
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No Yes 
No 5.43 5.44 5.43 
Yes 5.58 5.86 ** 5.74 * 
Total 5.53 5.73 * 5.65 
* Difference in mean values with respect to the complementary groups (i.e., “no gender similarity” 
and “no ethnic similarity” respectively) is statistically significant at 1% level. ** Difference in mean 
values with respect to the complementary groups (i.e., “neither gender nor ethnic similarity”, “ethnic 
similarity only” and “gender similarity only”) is statistically significant at 1% level. 
Table 2—Panel C points out how the two similarities cross to each other in our sample of 
investments. The coexistence of both gender and ethnic similarities represents the most common case 
in our sample (40.6% of the total), while only 14.6% of investments report neither gender nor ethnic 
similarity between investor and at least one founder. 
Finally, Table 2—Panel D reports the average amount invested (in logarithmic terms) by ethnic 
and gender similarity. These descriptive evidences allow us to draw some preliminary considerations 
on the hypotheses defined in Section 2. First, tests on differences in mean values between investments 
characterized by gender (ethnic) similarity and those where there is no gender (ethnic) similarity 
show that the amount invested in an equity crowdfunding campaign is significantly higher in case 
of gender (ethnic) similarity. Therefore, they seem to overall confirm both H1a and H1b. Second, 
statistical significance tests also reveal that the amount invested, on average, in a campaign when 
both gender and ethnic similarities coexist (5.86 or £2490) is significantly higher than the one reported 
in the other three cases (i.e., “neither gender nor ethnic similarity”, “ethnic similarity only” and 
“gender similarity only”). This additional evidence preliminary confirms H2 too, thus, the amount 
invested is further higher in the case of coexistence of gender and ethnic similarity between the 
investor and at least one founder. 
4. Model Specification and Variable Description 
We use ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to evaluate whether similarity patterns, in terms 
of ethnicity, gender and their interaction, increase the amount invested by individual investors. 
Specifically, we use the following specification: 
ݕ௜	ୀ	ఈ೔	ା	∑ ఉೞఠ೔	ା	యೞ	స	భ ∑ ఉೞఊ೔	ା	ఌ೔భబೞ	స	భ , (1) 
where y is the natural logarithm of the amount invested by each investor during the equity 
crowdfunding campaign; i identifies the individual investment (i = 1, 2, 3, …, 8600); βs are the 
parameters to be estimated, ϖ is a vector of independent variables that explicitly target the similarity 
between investor and founder and γ is a vector of control variables linked to investor, founder, 
company and campaign characteristics. 
The standard errors are robust and clustered by investors’ identification in order to control for 
non-independence of observations for investors across campaigns. We perform formal tests of 
variance inflated factor (VIF) and their results do not suggest a serious issue of multicollinearity. To 
capture possible temporal trends, we insert year fixed effects in all models. 
4.1. Independent Variables 
In the covariate group, we consider three variables that explicitly target the similarity between 
investor and founders. Specifically, the ethnic similarity effect is proxied by the variable Ethnic 
similarity, a dummy variable that equals 1 when investor and (at least one) founder share the same 
ethnicity, and 0 otherwise. The gender similarity effect is proxied by the variable Gender similarity, 
a dummy that equals 1 in case of gender similarity between investor and (at least one) founder, and 
0 otherwise. We also include the interaction between ethnic and gender similarities—Interaction 
(Ethnic & Gender similarity)—to explore the potential relationship of the two similarities. 
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4.2. Control Variables 
There are several variables that can influence the investment decision process of investors, for 
which we have to control. Some refer to investor and founder sociodemographic characteristics, 
others to company features, and others to campaign structure (Table 1). 
In order to control for sociodemographic characteristics of investor we introduce three dummy 
variables. The first one, Ethnic minority investor, is equal to 1 for investor belonging to the minority 
group; the second one is the dummy Female investor, a dummy variable equal to 1 for female investor 
and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for investor with a prior investment experience on Crowdcube 
as in Mohammadi and Shafi [57]. To do that, we introduce the dummy variable Serial investor, equal 
to 1 for investors that have participated in more than one campaign, and 0 otherwise. Serial investors 
represent 29% of the total sample and the logarithm transformation of the average amount they 
invested is 5.09 (Table 1). 
Variables related to the founder’s profile deal with ethnicity and gender characteristics. The 
ethnic profile is captured by the variable At least one ethnic minority founder, a dummy that equals 
1 if there is at least one ethnic minority founder in the company, and 0 for dominant ones. At least 
one female founder is a dummy variable that equals 1 for at least one woman among the founders of 
the company, and 0 otherwise. 
Company features first refer to the sector of business, which is captured by the variable 
Innovative, a dummy variable that equals 1 for companies active in highly innovative sectors, on the 
basis of SIC codes [63], and 0 otherwise. Then, the age of the company is captured by the variable 
Firm age—the number of years from the firm’s establishment to the date of the campaign; younger 
firms are riskier because they suffer from liabilities of newness and smallness and have short track 
records [57]. Finally, we add the variable Team size, computed as the logarithm of the number of 
people listed on the Crowdcube site as the group of executives and employees around the founder. 
A large number of team members is proportional to the number of investors and funding amount 
collected during the campaign [7,40]. 
Financial Campaign structure is proxied by the following variables. Goal amount is the 
logarithm of the target amount in the campaign and controls for the size of the project. As the goal 
amount variable could produce an endogeneity bias as evidenced by Cumming et al. [64,65], we 
replicated our baseline estimations without this variable and results do not change. All results are 
available upon request to the authors. 
 Equity offering is the percentage of equity offered during the campaign and can be considered 
as a proxy for firm risk for several reasons. On one hand, signalling theory [66] indicates the 
manager’s choice of raising equity as a negative signal for investors, since firms opportunistically 
choose to raise equity when managers know their shares are overvalued. Similarly, an owner’s 
decision to offer a lower amount of equity can indicate less adverse selection risk, in that a negative 
outcome is less likely to be perceived by owners [7]. Furthermore, larger equity offerings can dilute 
entrepreneurs’ incentive to commit to the firms involved. Altogether, more equity offering suggests 
that a firm is riskier [57]. Exit is a discrete variable that accounts for the number of exit strategies 
explicit in the campaign. A planned exit strategy influences the success of the campaign: i.e., receiving 
a return on the money invested. This is typically only attained through an exit or liquidity event, so 
the presence of different exit strategies could make a campaign more attractive [7].  
As evidenced by Cumming [64], Crowdcube also offers companies the possibility of placing both 
Class A (carrying voting rights) and Class B (not carrying voting rights). Given the investment 
threshold to acquire Class A is higher compared to Class B; we expect that this variable plays an 
important role in the investment size decision. Moreover, further analysis developed by the authors 
highlights that the coexistence of both gender and ethnic similarity positively and significantly affects 
the decision to invest in ‘A-shares’. However, including this variable in our baseline analysis could 
produce an endogeneity bias as evidenced by previous literature [64,65]. Nonetheless, we replicated 
our estimation considering a dummy variable for investment in A-shares (and in a sub-sample 
excluding A-shares investments) and results do not change. All results are available, upon request to 
the authors. 
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Note that, in the Appendix A, Table A1 shows details on variables’ definition while in the 
Appendix B, Table A2 illustrates correlation indexes between the dependent variable (i.e., logarithm 
of the amount invested in a campaign), the variables of interest (i.e., similarity dummies), and all 
covariates included in the model specification. 
5. Results 
5.1. Influences of Similarity on the Amount Invested 
Following the model specification overall described in Section 4, Mod. 1 and 2 of Table 3 show 
estimated effects of similarity on the amount invested in a single campaign for the overall sample. 
The estimation results of Mod. 1 highlight that ethnic similarity between investor and founder 
determines, ceteris paribus, a 17% increase in the amount invested, whereas gender similarity turns 
out to have an opposite impact (−12%) on the dependent variable. When the interaction between 
similarity variables is included, Mod. 2 shows that ethnic similarity has a positive and significant role 
on the amount invested in a campaign only if a coexistence with a gender similarity is in place. 
Therefore, as a result for the whole sample: (i) the presence of ethnic similarity alone does not seem 
to have any effect on the amount invested; (ii) the presence of gender similarity between investor and 
proponent alone reduces the amount invested by 22%; and (iii) the positive effect related to the 
coexistence of ethnic and gender similarity (+18% in the amount invested) covers the negative effects 
of gender similarity, making the overall effect of similarities on the dependent variable almost null. 
Moreover, it is important to specify that both in Mod. 1 and Mod. 2, the similarity variables overall 
considered are always jointly significant at 1% level (F-Test equals 7.84 and 6.61). 
Table 3. OLS Regression: Similarity effect by ethnicity and gender groups of investors. 
 (Mod. 1) (Mod. 2) (Mod. 3) (Mod. 4) (Mod. 5) (Mod. 6) 









Constant 2.272 *** 2.342 *** 3.099 *** 2.075 *** 1.168 1.559 ** 
 (0.275) (0.277) (0.639) (0.336) (1.606) (0.717) 
Ethnic similarity 0.165 *** 0.038 −0.143 −0.399 *** 0.303 1.159 *** 
 (0.048) (0.080) (0.145) (0.125) (0.371) (0.250) 
Gender similarity −0.115 * −0.216 *** −0.753 *** −0.040 −0.868 ** 0.554 *** 
 (0.063) (0.081) (0.214) (0.102) (0.354) (0.153) 
Interaction (Ethnic & Gender similarity)  0.184 ** 0.125 0.518 *** 2.284 *** −0.896 *** 
  (0.093) (0.275) (0.142) (0.660) (0.293) 
Ethnic minority investor −0.150 *** -0.144 **     
 (0.056) (0.056)     
Female investor −0.506 *** −0.492 ***     
 (0.064) (0.065)     
Serial investor −0.726 *** −0.725 *** −0.391 ** −0.729 *** −1.106 *** −0.850 *** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.153) (0.054) (0.293) (0.102) 
At least one ethnic minority proponent 0.447*** 0.443***     
 (0.061) (0.062)     
At least one female proponent −0.369 *** −0.377 ***     
 (0.067) (0.067)     
Innovative −0.142 ** −0.142 ** −0.233 −0.034 −0.070 −0.395 ** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.190) (0.077) (0.441) (0.158) 
Firm age 0.110 *** 0.110 *** 0.089 *** 0.109 *** −0.008 0.120 *** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.012) (0.052) (0.026) 
Team size 0.099 ** 0.110 ** 0.128 0.175 *** −0.022 0.160 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.125) (0.056) (0.336) (0.115) 
Goal amount 0.321 *** 0.320 *** 0.229 *** 0.321 *** 0.431 *** 0.323 *** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.053) (0.028) (0.127) (0.062) 
Equity offering −0.859 *** −0.842 *** 0.292 −0.386 −2.253 −1.156 * 
 (0.264) (0.264) (0.830) (0.315) (1.708) (0.682) 
Exit 0.056 0.056 0.105 0.043 −0.210 0.124 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.110) (0.050) (0.334) (0.094) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test (Similarity variables) 7.84 *** 6.61 *** 7.97 *** 8.48 *** 7.84 *** 9.84 *** 
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Observations 8.600 8.600 1.336 5.696 267 1.301 
R-squared 0.122 0.123 0.125 0.109 0.254 0.165 
Adj. R-squared 0.120 0.121 0.117 0.107 0.215 0.156 
Notes: Dependent variables: log of amount invested by individual investor. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Models 3–6 do not include dummies for gender and ethnicity of both investors and proponents to 
avoid the perfect collinearity issue. For a description of the variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix 
A. 
Looking at estimated coefficients of covariates, most of them are in line with expectations and 
stable across the Models reported in Table 3. First, investors’ membership of an ethnic minority group 
seems to significantly reduce investment size in an equity crowdfunding campaign, indicating maybe 
a lower ‘(monetary) power of investing’ by this category of investors and a lower level of business-
related experiences [61,62]. Moreover, confirming a common finding in the economic literature, 
results show that female investors tend to invest less than male ones (49% less if we consider Mod. 
2). This is probably related to the fact that women generally have a higher risk aversion compared to 
men [67], so they may prefer to diversify investment choices or be more careful overall. To be noted, 
the sample used to develop this analysis consists of investors only, so that the lower propensity of 
women to invest, in general, cannot be revealed here except for the composition of the sample itself. 
Therefore, the effect of being female estimated in this analysis for investors is already conditioned by 
the probability of investing in any equity crowdfunding campaign, and merely refers to the number 
of euros invested in a campaign. 
Furthermore, the negative and significant coefficient of the serial investors’ dummy confirms 
the descriptive statistics, pointing to a lower amount invested due to the high frequency of 
investments. This investment behavior, common for all columns of Table 3 (i.e., regardless of the 
ethnic and gender origin of the investors), seems to suggest more a gambling strategy than a genuine 
interest in the campaign. 
As for control variables related to the founder’s profile, estimation results in Table 3 (Mod. 1 and 
2) show that the amount invested increases by 44% if the campaign has a founder belonging to an 
ethnic minority group and, conversely, the amount invested decreases by about 37% if the campaign 
has at least one female founder. All variables reporting company features clearly play an important 
role in investment size decision. In particular, the amount invested in equity crowdfunding 
campaigns is higher for older companies, while being innovative appears to decrease the amount 
invested. In line with Vismara [11] and Ahlers et al. [7], larger teams attract higher invested amounts. 
Finally, as regards to covariates related to the campaign structures, investors report, ceteris paribus, 
a greater amount invested when the goal amount is higher and when the share of equity offered is 
lower, whereas the positive sign related to the exit strategy is not statistically significant. In 
conclusion, as expected, the level of amount invested changes according to campaign and company 
features, but investors’ and founders’ characteristics turn out to have an overwhelming role.  
Estimates reported in Mod. 2 of Table 3 highlight that the overall effect of similarities on the 
dependent variable is almost null in the case of coexistence of ethnic and gender similarity; however, 
this finding may be related to important differences within the group of investors analyzed. For this 
reason, we also decide to explore whether potential similarity effects are heterogeneous by the 
ethnicity and gender of investors. Results in Mod. 3–6 show estimates from a combination of ethnic 
and gender groups of investors: female/male investors belonging to dominant ethnic groups (Mod. 3 
and 4) and female/male investors belonging to minority ethnic groups (Mod. 5 and 6). With regard 
to ethnic similarity, results show that it does not significantly affect female investors (Mod. 3 and 5), 
and it produces divergent effects on male ones (Mod. 4 and 6). In fact, male investors belonging to 
the dominant ethnicity tend to invest a smaller amount of money (specifically 40% less) in an equity 
crowdfunding campaign in the case of ethnic similarity with at least one proponent, while the 
opposite occurs (i.e., +116% in the amount invested) for male investors belonging to an ethnic 
minority group. Turning to the gender similarity, it has positive effects on the amount invested in a 
campaign among male investors belonging to an ethnic minority (Mod. 6), whereas it has a negative 
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effect on female investors varying between −75% and −87% according to their ethnicity (Mod. 3 and 
5). 
Finally, estimated results for the interaction term allow us to provide three further interesting 
findings. First, the coexistence of similarity patterns positively influences the investment size for male 
investors belonging to the dominant ethnicity and for female investors belonging to an ethnic 
minority (Mod. 4 and 5). In both cases, the positive impacts of the similarities’ coexistence 
(respectively, +52% for males and +228% for females) overpass, in magnitude, the negative ones 
coming from single similarities. This means that the overall effect of similarity on the amount 
invested is positive and equals to about +8% for male investors belonging to the dominant ethnicity 
and to about +172% for female investors belonging to an ethnic minority. 
Second, when we consider male investors belonging to an ethnic minority group (Mod. 6), the 
coexistence of ethnic and gender similarity is, instead, negative and seems to moderate the joint 
positive effect of similarities on the amount invested. Nonetheless the overall effect of similarity on 
the investment size remains the second highest one (i.e., +82%) among the four subcategories 
analyzed. Third, the effect of similarities’ coexistence is insignificant for female investors belonging 
to the dominant ethnicity, which thus represent only one category of investors reporting a similarity 
effect overall negative (−77%) on the amount invested. 
In conclusion, as regards to H1a and H1b, similarity patterns seem to significantly influence the 
amount invested in a campaign, but their effects change according to investors’ ethnicity and gender. 
Moreover, the coexistence of different homophily patterns (ethnicity and gender) between investor 
and founder boosts the amount invested by the single investor, thus indicating the existence of a 
cumulative effect of similarity patterns (H2), except for the subsample of female investors belonging 
to the dominant minority group. 
5.2. A Shapley Decomposition Analysis of Drivers 
The analysis presented in the previous section, grounded on the OLS regression method, 
provides the impact (in terms of both extent and statistical significance) of each variable on the 
amount invested in an equity crowdfunding campaign, but it does not allow us to understand their 
relative importance in our model specification. In other words, it is not possible to rank the variable 
effects on the investment decision process. To better identify their concurring role in investment size, 
we investigate the importance and relative effects of the different independent variables on the 
logarithm of the amount invested per campaign. In our model specification, it is possible to 
distinguish between five groups of variables: (i) similarity (i.e., one dummy for each type of similarity 
and their interaction term); (ii) investor characteristics (i.e., sociodemographic variable on investors’ 
gender and ethnicity, and seriality); (iii) founder characteristics (i.e., sociodemographic variables for 
proponents’ gender and ethnicity); (iv) company characteristics (i.e., variables for innovative sector 
of activity, firm age, and team size); and (v) campaign characteristics (i.e., variables for goal amount, 
equity offering and exit strategy). 
To estimate the explanatory power of the independent variables, we refer to the Shapley 
decomposition method [30] which allows the goodness-of-fit measure of an econometric model to be 
distributed among regressors. As a goodness-of-fit measure, we adopt the total R2-value obtained 
from the OLS estimations of Mod. 2–6 of Table 3. Since some attributes consist of groups of variables, 
we use a generalization of the Shapley value, the Owen value [68], for decomposition in the case of 
exogenously grouped regressors, as suggested by Shorrocks [69]. Results of the Shapley and Owen 
decomposition methods are reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Shapley and Owen value decomposition of R-squared by investors’ characteristics. 
Groups Variables 
(Mod. 2) Total sample (Mod.3) Dominant 
Female 
(Mod. 4) Dominant 
Male 


























Ethnic similarity 1.01 4.45 0.54 28.39 1.52 10.02 3.49 27.81 2.82 14.28 
Gender similarity 1.27  19.46  3.34  4.08  9.25  
Interaction (Ethnic and 
Gender similarity) 
2.18  8.39  5.16  20.25  2.21  
Investor characteristics 
Ethnic minority investor 1.44 35.92         
Female investor 5.44          
Serial investor 29.03  5.43 5.43 36.17 36.17 23.00 23.00 39.00 39.00 
Founder 
characteristics 
At least one ethnic 
minority founder  
0.74 8.22               
At least one  
female founder 
7.48          
Company 
characteristics 
Innovative 1.19 24.88 3.13 40.07 0.27 21.52 5.15 28.92 3.90 24.73 
Firm age 13.16  7.73  15.50  2.61  11.11  
Team size 10.53  29.21  5.75  21.17  9.72  
Campaign 
characteristics 
Goal amount 23.64 26.53 20.28 26.11 29.58 32.30 15.19 20.27 17.15 21.99 
Equity offering 0.70  0.37  0.92  1.22  1.58  
Exit 2.18  5.47  1.81  3.86  3.26  
Note: This table reports the fraction of the overall R-squared (per cent), explained by the different groups of characteristics—Owen value (Gr)—and the individual share 
(Ind) of the overall R-squared (per cent) associated with each variable belonging to a specific characteristic (Shapley decomposition). These shares are median values within 
bootstrap percentile confidence intervals (level of confidence: 90%). This explains cases where Total is not always 100.00. Year fixed effects are not considered in Models. 
For a description of the variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix A.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 3539 14 of 24 
 
As expected, being a serial investor plays an important role in explaining heterogeneity in the 
amount invested during the campaign, since about 29% of the R-squared for total sample (Mod. 2) 
depends on this single variable. Decomposition results also underline the pivotal role that campaign 
and company characteristics have on the amount invested, which is nearly exclusively related to the 
goal amount for the campaign and on the company’s age and team size for the company. Regarding 
the remaining variables, the overall R-squared for the full sample can be explained mainly by two 
groups of characteristics: founder profile, which is linked to the presence of at least one female 
founder in the company; and the dummies referring to similarity patterns between investor and 
founders, as well as their interaction term. Since the latter has the highest explanatory power among 
the group of ‘similarity variables’, this finding further confirms the role of the coexistence of ethnic 
and gender similarities also in determining investment size variability. 
As in the previous analysis, we disaggregate our sample by investors’ gender and ethnic origin. 
Table 4 highlights that female and male investors look at different aspects when deciding how much 
to invest in a campaign. Investors’ characteristics play the most important role in explaining the 
heterogeneity of the investment sizes for male investors, independently of ethnicity, probably 
because of their higher propensity to gamble [70] (Table 4, Mod. 4 and 6), while female investors 
attach more importance to company characteristics and to team size (Table 4, Mod. 3 and 5). 
Differences between female and male investors also emerge for the group of similarity variables. 
For female investors, similarity variables represent the second most important group of variables in 
explaining the heterogeneity of investment sizes (Table 4, Mod. 3 and 5) while male investors attach 
less importance—nearly half—to these homophily patterns (Table 4, Mod. 4 and 6). It is worth noting 
that for female investors, important differences emerge between dominant and ethnic minority. In 
particular, for female investors belonging to the dominant ethnic group, the similarity variables 
account for nearly 28% of the overall R-squared (Table 4, Mod. 3), given the role played by the gender 
similarity variable. In contrast, the interaction term representing the coexistence of the two similarity 
patterns (ethnicity and gender) appears to play a primary role for female investors belonging to an 
ethnic minority group, showing almost the same explanatory power as the team size (Table 4, Mod. 
5). 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
Both the OLS regression estimates and the Shapley decomposition analysis highlighted the large 
importance of investment seriality in describing the amount invested, and its dynamics, in equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. To test whether the peculiar behavior adopted by serial investors 
influences our results, here we present a robustness check where serial investors are included just 
once (i.e., only their first investment is considered) in the sample of investments. Tables 5 and 6 report 
results of the same analysis, illustrated in Section 5.1 and 5.2, for a sample with this serial investor 
adjustment. 
The main findings remain qualitatively the same and the overall stability of the estimated 
coefficients confirms the robustness of our results. Only a few differences are worth mentioning. As 
for the OLS regression analysis, Table 5 shows that variables related to the interaction of the two 
similarities and to investor ethnicity lose their statistical significance (Mod. 2R). This happens only 
for the entire sample, while for the subsamples analyzed, our results are robust to the serial investor 
adjustment, once more highlighting the heterogeneity that affects our groups of investors. 
Table 5. Similarity effects with serial investors’ adjustment. 
 (Mod. 1R) (Mod. 2R) (Mod. 3R) (Mod. 4R) (Mod. 5R) (Mod. 6R) 









Constant 1.769 *** 1.830 *** 2.522 *** 1.584 *** 0.052 −0.175 
 (0.329) (0.331) (0.681) (0.418) (1.989) (0.919) 
Ethnic similarity 0.195 *** 0.083 −0.020 −0.628 *** 0.278 2.189 *** 
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 (0.061) (0.101) (0.158) (0.169) (0.465) (0.317) 
Gender similarity −0.123 * −0.215** −0.805 *** 0.042 −1.522 *** 0.773 *** 
 (0.073) (0.097) (0.244) (0.140) (0.398) (0.211) 
Interaction (Ethnic and Gender 
similarity) 
 0.164 −0.046 0.750 *** 3.312 *** −1.942 *** 
 
 (0.115) (0.305) (0.190) (0.729) (0.381) 
Ethnic minority investor −0.062 −0.058 
  (0.073) (0.073) 
Female investor −0.568 *** −0.557 *** 
 (0.073) (0.074) 
Serial investor −0.756 *** −0.759 *** −0.538 * −0.805 *** −1.516 ** −0.693 *** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.309) (0.103) (0.590) (0.195) 
At least one ethnic minority 
proponent 
0.495 *** 0.491 *** 
 
 (0.081) (0.081) 
At least one female proponent −0.533 *** −0.538 *** 
 (0.079) (0.079) 
Innovative −0.111 −0.111 −0.443 ** 0.033 0.909 −0.345 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.220) (0.102) (0.639) (0.228) 
Firm age 0.116 *** 0.116 *** 0.088 *** 0.133 *** −0.047 0.112 *** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) (0.015) (0.062) (0.031) 
Team size 0.136 ** 0.144 *** 0.051 0.300 *** 0.129 0.204 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.144) (0.072) (0.392) (0.152) 
Goal amount 0.363 *** 0.362 *** 0.267 *** 0.348 *** 0.497 *** 0.460 *** 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.057) (0.034) (0.154) (0.080) 
Equity offering −1.099 *** −1.089 *** 0.334 −0.406 −1.570 −1.965 ** 
 (0.344) (0.344) (0.989) (0.418) (2.000) (0.909) 
Exit 0.046 0.047 0.131 0.023 −0.697 0.197 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.125) (0.066) (0.467) (0.129) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test (Similarity variables) 6.71 *** 5.21 *** 9.70 *** 13.30 *** 13.62 *** 16.70 *** 
Observations 5.995 5.995 1.148 3.783 213 851 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.139 0.109 0.266 0.167 
Adj. R-squared 0.120 0.120 0.129 0.106 0.218 0.154 
Note: Dependent variables: log of amount invested by individual investor. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Models 
3–6 do not include dummies for gender and ethnicity of both investors and proponents to avoid the 
perfect collinearity issue. For a description of the variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix A. 
As for the Shapley decomposition analysis, as expected, Table 6 shows that individual and group 
shares of R-squared, presented by similarity dummies and other covariates, increase when the 
adjustment for serial investors is considered. This increase particularly involves the role of similarity 
dummies across the six different Models analyzed, explaining more than one third of the investment 
size heterogeneity among the various groups of investors, except for male investors belonging to the 
dominant group (Table 6, Mod. 4R).  
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Table 6. Shapley and Owen value decomposition of R-squared by investors’ characteristics with serial investors’ adjustment. 
Groups Variables 
(Mod. 2R) Total Sample 
(Mod. 3R) Dominant 
Female 
(Mod. 4R) Dominant 
Male 
(Mod. 5R) Minority 
Female 
(Mod. 6R) Minority 
Male 
Ind. %  Group % Ind. %  Group %  Ind. %  Group %  Ind. %  Group %  Ind. %  Group %  
R-Squared R-Squared R-Squared R-Squared R-Squared R-Squared R-Squared R-Squared R-Squared R-Squared 
Similarity 










Gender similarity 1.96 20.26 6.42 9.49 11.52 
Interaction (Ethnic and  
Gender similarity) 
2.26 10.68 7.14 35.33 8.02 
Investor 
characteristics 









7.23 Female investor 9.56     
Serial investor 7.66 0.82 12.29 4.33 7.23 
Founder 
characteristics 




         












21.94 Firm age 17.20 7.87 24.48 1.38 10.59 
Team size 10.37 25.81 4.58 21.20 9.34 
Campaign 
characteristics 









39.64 Equity offering 1.36 0.48 1.96 1.01 3.42 
Exit 2.59 6.08 1.99 5.22 4.92 
Note: This table reports the fraction of the overall R-squared (per cent), explained by the different groups of characteristics—Owen value (Gr)—and the individual share 
(Ind) of the overall R-squared (per cent) associated with each variable belonging to a specific characteristic (Shapley decomposition). These shares are median values within 
bootstrap percentile confidence intervals (level of confidence: 90%). This explains cases where Total is not always 100.00. Year fixed effects are not considered in Models. 
For a description of the variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix A.
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Moreover, among the similarity group of variables, the gender similarity dummy plays a 
primary role in the explained variance of the dependent variable, except for the case of female 
investors belonging to an ethnic minority (Table 6, Mod. 5R), where the interaction of ethnic and 
gender similarity variable is the most important. It is worth underlining that the ethnic similarity 
variable shows the highest value for male investors belonging to an ethnic minority group (Table 6, 
Mod. 6R). 
Although the main results of our analysis remain the same overall, we prefer to consider the 
sample with the serial investor adjustment as a robustness check only. In fact, the lower number of 
observations may lead to more unstable estimates, especially when similarity effects by gender and 
ethnicity groups of investors are observed. 
6. Discussion 
This study identifies whether and how the ethnic and gender similarity among founder and 
investor affects the invested amount in an equity crowdfunding campaign. The results show that 
similarity, in terms of both ethnic and gender matching, conditions the level of amount invested, but 
its effects change according to investors’ characteristics. Particularly, unlike previous studies [29,33], 
our work evidences that in equity crowdfunding, female investors show a clear preference to invest 
a higher amount in men-led campaigns. Nevertheless, female founders belonging to an ethnic 
minority group receive significant amount from female investors sharing the same ethnic origin. For 
male investors, the level of amount invested in the campaign is higher if they have the same ethnic 
minority profile as the founder. We find that similarity in equity crowdfunding, seems to enlarge the 
potential funding sources for founders belonging to an ethnic minority group. Consistent with Butticè 
and Useche [27], crowdfunding offers ethnic minority entrepreneurs an effective setting to activate 
external networks to collect financial resources. An ethnic match, especially for ethnic minority 
groups, compensates other campaign aspects, such as team size and the presence of an exit strategy. 
For ethnic minority female investors, the level of amount invested in the campaign is favored by the 
coexistence of ethnic and gender similarity patterns. Consistent with the homophily literature, we 
conclude that gender and ethnic similarities between investor and founder, as well as any of their 
combinations, also significantly affect the variability of the amount invested in equity crowdfunding 
campaigns, whereas a lower importance appeared to be associated to financial characteristics. 
By combining both ethnic and gender similarity, at first, we contribute to the study about 
similarity patterns between investor and founder as a driver of investment decisions for new venture 
ideas (e.g., [23,25,29]). In the online context, ethnic similarity strengthens the network mechanisms 
that underlie crowdfunding to harness communities of investors, improving solidarity, mobilizing 
ethnic groups and overcoming barriers in relation to access to finance [27]. Ethnicity is often a basis 
for differential acculturation, which shapes values and personal identity. Ethnic similarity entails a 
broad range of cultural aspects that combine to create a group-level identity able to overcome other 
individual identity characteristics, and thus, the perception of common barriers faced. Due to ethnic 
solidarity, investors tend to support businesses led by immigrant groups concentrated in a distinct 
spatial location and which serve their own ethnic market and/or the general population [71,72]. 
Secondly, in the field of equity crowdfunding studies, we contribute new insights to the 
emerging research on crowd investors (e.g., [31,32]) by showing that the level of amount invested is 
driven not only by financial motivations, but also by founders’ and investors’ sociodemographic 
characteristics. As highlighted by Polzin et al. [73], a better understanding of crowd investor 
characteristics reduces ex-ante search costs and facilitates ex-post matching. Our results highlight 
that the coexistence of similarity patterns in the investment decision process is particularly strong for 
female investors belonging to an ethnic minority group. From the seekers’ perspective, our study 
allows women and ethnic minority entrepreneurs to identify the investor behaviors and 
characteristics that maximize fund raising opportunities through equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
From the suppliers’ perspective, we identify how women and ethnic minorities perceive and invest 
in equity crowdfunding projects, thus contributing to theory building. 
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Finally, we contribute to the nascent literature on equity crowdfunding as a tool for supporting 
financial inclusion. Financial inclusion is, in fact, defined as a state in which individuals or firms have 
access to financial products and services appropriate to their needs [74–76] or as a multi-dimensional 
process which requires three dimensions to be financially inclusive: accessibility, availability and 
usage [77]. In our study, equity crowdfunding appears to be a fintech tool for the sustainable financial 
inclusion of ethnic minorities in the financial system, for both seekers and suppliers of capital. For 
investors, equity crowdfunding increases the pool of potential opportunities to invest in 
entrepreneurial projects allowing a faster, cheaper, more transparent and more efficient access to 
financial services. For ethnic minority entrepreneurs, increased access to a new stream of investors 
means the availability of capital and the opportunity to overcome market financial constraints. 
From a practical perspective, our results are relevant not only for ethnic minorities and females 
but for all entrepreneurs, investors, and crowdfunding platforms alike, as understanding crowd 
composition and investment dynamics are in the interest of all groups. Such knowledge may boost 
fundraising opportunities for crowdfunding proponents, especially for equity models. Therefore, 
female and ethnic minority entrepreneurs can figure out how to overcome the financial barriers 
encountered when pursuing their entrepreneurial goals [78]. For policy, the importance of fostering 
mutual understanding between crowdfunding and ethnic minority businesses by improving 
engagement and information flows, has to be emphasized through programs of action learning, 
intended to enable entrepreneurs of various ethnic backgrounds to appreciate this new 
entrepreneurial finance tool. Regulators in emerging and developing economies should also promote 
this inclusive financial innovation through the implementation of innovative regulatory initiatives 
that are explicitly targeting and delivered in a responsible way, thereby directly impacting financial 
inclusion [79,80]. 
Our research has some limitations but, as a result, also suggests promising directions for future 
research. This study focuses on two sociodemographic factors at the basis of similarity—ethnicity 
and gender; in the future, other multiple similarity patterns such as age, need similarity, and value 
similarity should be investigated. In our study, we do not examine the content of pictures, video and 
descriptions published in the campaign with respect to the level of proponent’s attractiveness and 
charisma or language adopted. Another important aspect that could reinforce similarity as a driver 
of investment decision in the crowdfunding context, is the business sector, as pointed out by 
Greenberg and Mollick [29]. Investors in crowdfunding take into account not only tangible benefits 
but also societal ones and studies evidence the importance of sustainable orientation of the business 
in reaching the funding goal and in attracting backers [64,81–85]. Future work should be directly 
addressed to the evaluation of whether and how ethnic and gender similarity affect the investment 
size in case of business characterized by different sustainable orientation. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Variables—name and description. 
Variable Description 
Amount invested 
Natural logarithm of the amount invested by each investor during the 
equity crowdfunding campaign 
Ethnic similarity 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when investor and (at least one) founder 
share the same ethnicity, and 0 otherwise 
Gender similarity 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when investor and (at least one) founder 
share the same gender, and 0 otherwise 
Interaction (Ethnic and 
Gender similarity) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when investor and (at least one) founder 
share the same ethnicity and the same gender, and 0 otherwise 
Ethnic minority investor 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when investor belongs to the minority 
group, and 0 otherwise 
Female investor Dummy variable that equals 1 for female investors, and 0 otherwise 
Serial investor 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for investor that have participated in 
more than one campaign, and 0 otherwise 
At least one ethnic minority 
founder 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least one ethnic minority 
founder in the company, and 0 otherwise 
At least one female founder 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least one woman among the 
founders of the company, and 0 otherwise 
Innovative 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for companies active in highly innovative 
sectors, and 0 otherwise 
Firm age 
Number of years from the firm’s establishment to the date of  
the campaign 
Team size 
Logarithm of the number of people listed on the Crowdcube site as the 
group of executives and employees around the founder 
Goal amount Logarithm of the campaign target amount 
Equity offering Percentage of equity offered during the campaign 
Exit Number of exit strategies explicit in the campaign 
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Appendix B 
Table A2. Correlation matrix. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Amount invested 1.000                             
2. Ethnic similarity 0.051 1.000                           
3. Gender similarity 0.071 0.052 1.000                         
4. Interaction (Ethnic and Gender similarity) 0.087 0.712 0.559 1.000                       
5. Ethnic minority investor −0.046 −0.325 −0.007 −0.252 1.000                     
6. Female investor −0.057 0.031 −0.434 −0.262 −0.020 1.000                   
7. Serial investor −0.178 −0.055 0.021 −0.016 0.022 −0.163 1.000                 
8. At least one ethnic minority founder −0.018 −0.363 −0.077 −0.278 0.040 −0.010 0.043 1.000               
9. At least one female founder  −0.107 −0.115 −0.545 −0.323 0.028 0.044 0.041 0.066 1.000             
10. Innovative −0.032 0.007 0.026 0.006 −0.022 0.011 0.040 −0.027 −0.094 1.000           
11. Firm age 0.131 0.033 0.028 0.073 0.002 −0.006 −0.067 −0.194 −0.034 0.005 1.000         
12. Team size −0.096 0.004 −0.087 −0.100 0.033 0.043 −0.020 0.135 0.085 0.095 −0.340 1.000       
13. Goal amount 0.149 −0.033 −0.004 −0.042 0.005 0.104 −0.168 0.019 −0.100 0.003 -0.083 0.241 1.000     
14. Equity offering −0.018 −0.098 0.007 −0.069 −0.019 −0.034 0.049 0.265 −0.023 −0.191 −0.260 −0.020 0.159 1.000   
15. Exit 0.006 −0.001 −0.007 −0.030 −0.011 0.008 0.053 0.056 −0.039 0.146 −0.186 0.498 0.209 0.061 1.000 
Note: For a description of the variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix A. 
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